[经济学人] Trade and technology: Chip wars

Posted on December 10, 2018 本文总阅读量次

字数统计: 2,891字 | 阅读时长: 13分

Trade and technology
贸易与技术

Chip wars
芯片战
America cannot afford to ignore China’s semiconductor ambitions. It cannot easily tame them, either
对美国来说，中国发展半导体的雄心壮志不容忽视，但也不易打压

THE TRADE disputes President Donald Trump relishes have an old-fashioned feel. Tariffs are the principal weapons. Old-economy markets, from cars to steel, are the main battlefields. Farmers and factories preoccupy the president. And his personal chemistry with other powerful men can make or break deals. Hence the focus on the meeting between Mr Trump and Xi Jinping at the G20 summit took place last week.

特朗普钟爱的那种贸易战充满了老旧气息。主要武器是关税。主战场是从汽车到钢铁的旧经济市场。农民和工厂最叫他牵挂。而他与其他国家领导人之间私交的好坏深浅会左右谈判的成败。这是为何特朗普与习近平近日在G20峰会上的会晤如此吸引眼球。

Yet the trade conflict that matters most between America and China is a 21st-century fight over technology. It covers everything from artificial intelligence (AI) to network equipment. The fundamental battleground is in semiconductors. The chip industry is where America’s industrial leadership and China’s superpower ambitions clash most directly. And whatever Messrs Trump and Xi said at the G20, this conflict will outlast them both.

不过，中美贸易冲突中最重要的部分是一场21世纪的科技战。战火遍布从人工智能（AI）到网络设备等各个领域。根本战场是半导体。在芯片产业，美国的行业领导地位与中国的超级大国野心之间的冲撞最为直接。无论特朗普和习近平在G20峰会作何表态，这一冲突都会是超越两人任期的持久拉锯。

That is because computer chips are the foundations of the digital economy and national security. Cars have become computers on wheels. Banks are computers that move money. Armies fight with silicon as well as steel. Firms from America and its allies, such as South Korea and Taiwan, dominate the most advanced areas of the industry. China, by contrast, remains reliant on the outside world for supplies of high-end chips. It spends more on semiconductor imports than it does on oil. The list of the top 15 semiconductor firms by sales does not contain a single Chinese name.

这是因为计算机芯片是数字经济和国家安全的根基。汽车已经变成了带轮子的计算机；银行是调配资金的计算机；军队不仅用钢铁武器也用硅芯片作战。美国及其盟友（如韩国和台湾）的企业主导着该行业的尖端领域。相比之下，中国仍依赖外部供应高端芯片。中国在进口半导体上的支出比进口石油更大。销售额最高的巧家半导体公司中没有一家是中国大陆的企业。

Well before Mr Trump arrived on the scene, China made plain its intention to catch up. In 2014 the government in Beijing announced a 1trn yuan (\$150bn) investment fund to improve its domestic industry. Semiconductors feature prominently in “Made in China 2025”, a national development plan issued in 2015.

在特朗普上任之前很久，中国就已清楚表明追赶的意图。2014年，中国政府宣布成立规模以万亿元人民币计的投资基金以促进国内半导体产业发展。在2015年颁布的国家发展规划《中国制造2025》中，半导体产业占据突出地位。

China’s ambitions to create a cutting-edge industry worried Mr Trump’s predecessor. Barack Obama blocked Intel from selling some of its whizziest chips to China in 2015, and stymied the acquisition of a German chipmaker by a Chinese firm in 2016. A White House report before he left office recommended taking action against Chinese subsidies and forced technology transfer. Other countries are alarmed, too. Taiwan and South Korea have policies to stop purchases of domestic chip firms by Chinese ones and to dam flows of intellectual property.

中国打造尖端产业的雄心令特朗普的前任奥巴马感到担忧。2015年他阻止英特尔向中国出售部分最新型芯片，并在2016年阻碍中国公司收购德国的一家芯片制造商。他离任前的一份白宫报告建议采取行动反对中国的产业补贴和强制性技术转让。其他国家和地区也加紧提防。韩国和台湾制定了政策，阻止中国大陆企业收购本地芯片公司，并防止知识产权外流。

Although the chip battle may have pre-dated Mr Trump, his presidency has intensified it. He has made a national champion of Qualcomm, blocking a bid for it from a Singaporean firm for fear of Chinese competition. Earlier this year an export ban on selling American chips and software to ZTE, a Chinese telecoms firm in breach of sanctions, brought it to the brink of bankruptcy within days. Startled by the looming harm, and (he says) swayed by appeals from Mr Xi, Mr Trump swiftly backtracked.

芯片战也许在特朗普上任前就已打响，但他上台后加剧了战事。因为担心来自中国的竞争，他阻止了一家新加坡公司收购高通，把高通变成了一家代表国家利益的企业。今年早前，美国因中国通讯企业中兴违反美国制裁规定而下令禁止对其出口美国芯片和软件，几天之内就将中兴逼至破产边缘。但惊觉此举可能招致自损，加上（他自称）受习近平的呼吁影响，特朗普迅速收手。

Two things have changed. First, America has realised that its edge in technology gives it power over China. It has imposed export controls that affect on Fujian Jinhua, another Chinese firm accused of stealing secrets, and the White House is mulling broader bans on emerging technologies. Second, China’s incentives to become self-reliant in semiconductors have rocketed. After ZTE, Mr Xi talked up core technologies. Its tech giants are on board: Alibaba, Baidu and Huawei are ploughing money into making chips. And China has showed that it can hinder American firms. Earlier this year Qualcomm abandoned a bid for NXP, a Dutch firm, after foot-dragging by Chinese regulators.

两个方面已经发生了变化。首先，美国已意识到可凭借技术优势牵制中国。美国已对另一家被指控窃取机密的中国公司福建晋华实施了出口管制措施。白宫正在考虑围绕新兴技术推出更广泛的禁令。第二，中国在半导体领域自力更生的动力飘升。在中兴事件后，习近平大谈特谈核心技术。中国的科技巨头纷纷响应：阿里巴巴、百度和华为正大举投资研制芯片。中国已显示自己可以牵制美国公司。今年早些时候，在中国监管机构的阻挠之下，高通放弃了对荷兰公司恩智浦的收购计划。

Neither country’s interests are about to change. America has legitimate concerns about the national-security implications of being dependent on Chinese chips and vulnerable to Chinese hacking. China’s pretensions to being a superpower will look hollow as long as America can throttle its firms at will. China is destined to try to catch up; America is determined to stay ahead.

两国的利益立场都不会改变。美国有正当理由担心依赖中国芯片会产生国家安全以及被中国黑客攻击的风险。只要美国能随意扼杀中国企业，中国超级大国的自我标榜就是一句空话。中国必然要奋力追赶，而美国决意保持领先。

The hard question is over the lengths to which America should go. Protectionists in the White House would doubtless like to move the semiconductor supply chain to America. Good luck with that. The industry is a hymn to globalisation. One American firm has 16,000 suppliers, over half of them abroad. China is a huge market for many firms. Qualcomm makes two-thirds of its sales there. Trying to cleave the industry into two would hurt producers and consumers in America. And it would be a bluntly antagonistic act, which would make no distinction between unfair and genuine competition.

难题在于美国的动作该多大。白宫的保护主义派无疑希望将半导体供应链转移到美国。祝他们好运。半导体行业可谓全球化的一曲赞歌。一家美国公司就拥有16,000家供应商，其中超过一半位于海外。中国对许多公司而言都是一个巨大的市场。高通三分之二的销售额来自中国。试图把该行业一分为二将损害美国的生产者和消费者。这还是一种公然的对抗行为，会把不公平竞争和真正的竞争混为一谈。

In the long run it may be futile, too. Today America has the edge over China in designing and making high-end chips. It can undoubtedly slow its rival. But China’s progress will be hard to stop. Just as Silicon Valley’s rise rested on the support of the American government, so China blends state and corporate resources in pursuit of its goals. It has incentive programmes to attract engineering talent from elsewhere, notably Taiwan. Firms like Huawei have a proven ability to innovate; blocking the flow of Intel chips in 2015 only spurred China on to develop its domestic supercomputing industry.

长远来看，这可能也徒劳无功。目前美国在设计和制造高端芯片方面优于中国，无疑可以拖慢竞争对手的发展。但中国的进步难以阻挡。正如硅谷的崛起有赖于美国政府的支持，中国政府也在综合国家和企业的资源来实现自身目标。政府推出激励计划吸引其他地方的工程人才，特别是台湾。像华为这样的公司已经证实了自己的创新能力；2015年的对华禁售芯片之举结果只激励了中国加紧发展自己的超级计算产业。

Moreover, China’s bid to become a global semiconductor powerhouse is propitiously timed. For decades the chip industry has been driven forward by Moore’s law, under which the capabilities of a chip of a given size double every two years. But Moore’s law is reaching its physical limits. As everyone jumps to new technologies, from quantum computing to specialised ai chips, China has a rare chance to catch up.

此外，中国要成为全球半导体强国的努力顺应天时。几十年来，芯片行业的发展一直遵循摩尔定律（既定尺寸的芯片的性能每两年翻一番）。但摩尔定律正在接近物理极限。随着所有人都转向从量子计算到专用Al芯片等新技术，中国有了难得的赶超机会。

The right approach for America, therefore, has three strands. The first is to work with its allies in Europe and Asia to keep pushing back against unfair Chinese practices (such as forced tech transfer and intellectual-property theft) at the World Trade Organisation, and to screen out inward Chinese investments when security justifies it. The second is to foster domestic innovation. More government funding is already going into chip research; greater openness to talent is needed. And the third is to prepare for a world in which Chinese chips are more powerful and pervasive. That means, among other things, developing proper testing procedures to ensure the security of Chinese-made products; and tightening up on data-handling standards so that information is not being sprayed about so carelessly. Measures such as these will not make the headlines at the G20. But they will do more to shape the world in the years ahead.

因此，美国的正确应对方式应从三方面入手。首先是与欧洲和亚洲的盟友合作，继续在世贸组织反对中国的不公平做法（例如强制性技术转让和窃取知识产权），并把确实会危害美国国家安全的中国对美投资阻挡在外。其次是促进国内创新。已有更多的政府资金投入芯片研究，而美国还需要更加开放地引进人才。第三是要做好准备，应对更强大、更流行的中国芯片。也就是说，除其他措施外，美国还需制定适当的测试程序以确保中国产品的安全性，此外还要提高数据处理标准，防止信息被随意泄露。这类措施不会在G20峰会上成为头条新闻，但会在未来几年塑造世界格局上发挥更大的作用。

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